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Nudging Subjects at Risk: Social Impact Bonds 
between Financialization and Compassion 
Manuel Wirth ∗ 
Abstract: »Anstöße für gefährdete Subjekte - Soziale Wirkungskredite zwi-
schen Finanzialisierung und Mitgefühl«. This paper explores the consequences 
of a recent Social Impact Bond (SIB) implementation in the UK at the level of 
everyday practices in three youth homelessness charities. By focusing on the 
effects of measuring and valuation devices, it is argued that the SIB transforms 
the way social welfare is delivered: it redefines practices, relationships, and in-
teractions within service provision along the ambiguous dynamics of market-
ization processes. On the one hand, this is characterized by moments of crea-
tive articulation whereby service interventions connect a multitude of logics 
and narratives and exhibit both an emotionalized and behaviorist content. On 
the other hand, as this paper shows, economic principles underpinning the SIB 
are performatively actualized in the scheme, shaping interactions and relation-
ships. The paper concludes that these two processes should be conceived not as 
mutually exclusive but as concomitant, yet conflictive forces that shape the 
marketization process of SIBs. 
Keywords: Social impact investing, marketization, social finance, emotional 
governance, social impact bonds, United Kingdom. 
1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen the proliferation of financial market-oriented methods 
to tackle growing environmental problems and widening social inequality. 
Many of these initiatives are marked by an increased awareness regarding the 
detrimental effects of financial market practices and discourses of “humanized 
capitalism” and “moral markets” (Jupp et al. 2017). A phenomenon that has 
become increasingly popular in recent years is impact investing: an investment 
strategy that situates itself morally apart from mainstream investment practices 
(Kish and Fairbairn 2018) by pursuing investment opportunities that produce 
both a financial return and social/environmental impact (Höchstädter and 
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Scheck 2015). By harnessing the powerful instruments of financial capitalism, 
its proponents argue, social and environmental problems could be solved more 
efficiently and chronic shortage of funding for the social sector could be over-
come (Cohen 2014). 
Particularly in the United Kingdom, an impact investing initiative called So-
cial Impact Bonds (SIB) has attracted a lot of attention by policymakers. An 
SIB is a funding tool and social policy instrument that aims to address complex 
social problems like homelessness, unemployment, or recidivism, amongst 
others. In an attempt to innovate funding and delivery models for welfare ser-
vices, SIBs have been systematically rolled out, tested, and refined by subse-
quent UK governments with the promise to provide social organizations with 
alternative ways to access finance in a climate of welfare cuts (Dear et al. 
2016). 
Social Impact Bonds seem to be particularly attractive for governments and 
financial market actors. On the one hand, they are multiparty contracts connect-
ing a government agency, impact investors, and a third sector organization in a 
payment-by-results architecture based on an elaborate impact measurement 
design (Rangan and Chase 2015). On the other hand, they are advertised as 
vehicles to spur and test innovative delivery models to poverty alleviation, thus 
representing potential outlets for the latest social policy trends (Liebman 2011). 
Hence, proponents claim that for governments SIBs hold the potential for sav-
ing costs, making welfare services more innovative, and aligning social service 
provision with market-led and entrepreneurial logics. For investors, in turn, 
they offer the opportunity to tackle social inequality, diversify their portfolio, 
and make financial profit at the same time. 
In the wake of the proliferation of “concerned” (Geiger et al. 2014) or “civi-
lizing” markets (Callon 2009), SIBs are interesting objects to study. As an 
approach that aims to marry the production of financial profit and measurable 
social impact, they draw on a multiplicity of measurement and (financial) valu-
ation techniques to commensurate the competing realms of economic and so-
cial value (Barman 2015; Chiapello 2015). In doing so, these instruments do 
not only intervene in the framing of a market space to enable price setting or 
facilitating exchange, but also function as valuation devices that value those 
organizations or actors implementing them (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017).  
The article takes this as a starting point to investigate the effects of financial 
innovations on charity practices and recipients of social services by taking the 
example of a recent SIB implementation in the UK, the Fair Chance Fund 
SIBs. Focusing on the impact of measuring and valuation, it argues that the SIB 
transforms the way social welfare is delivered: it redefines practices, relations, 
and interactions within service provision according to the conflicting dynamics 
of marketization processes. The argument of this paper is twofold. First, against 
common assumptions suggesting that marketization turns everything into a 
“cash nexus” and impersonalizes relationships, it demonstrates that SIBs pro-
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liferate emotional work and articulate alternative logics that go beyond purely 
economic ones. Hence, it argues that the binary between market logic and 
alternative logics (such as compassion or intimacy) is an ideal-type division 
that does not hold in practice. Second, at the same time, however, market prin-
ciples have to be reinscribed in order for SIBs to be successful, a process of 
reframing that partly reinserts “the separation between the market and its vari-
ous others” (Berndt and Wirth 2018, 13). 
In order to shed light on these processes, the article takes inspiration from 
social studies of economization and geographies of marketization literature 
(Çalışkan and Callon 2010; Berndt and Boeckler 2011). Writings in this tradi-
tion draw attention to the fact that marketization is always a contested, ambig-
uous, and open-ended process that involves an “ambivalent double play of 
debordering (overflowing) and bordering (framing) processes” (Berndt and 
Boeckler 2011, 1062, emphasis in the original). Both moments are not seen as 
mutually exclusive but concomitant, yet conflictive forces that shape market-
ization processes (ibid.). This allows the analysis to be sensitive to findings 
from scholars such as Viviana Zelizer (e.g., 2011) who have shown that the 
seemingly separate realms of economy and non-economy are constantly mixed 
in everyday life (overflowing) while acknowledging at the same time the need 
to practically re-establish market discipline (framing) to hold market-based 
interventions together. This reframing is the performative work of calculative 
devices, practices, and narratives (Callon 1998; MacKenzie et al. 2007). I will 
argue below that SIBs are perfect examples for these processes and it is the 
fuzziness and malleability involved that makes them attractive for decision-
makers. 
The argument is developed in four steps. In section 2, the architecture of the 
Fair Chance Fund SIBs in the United Kingdom is presented, placing a special 
emphasis on the design of the valuation infrastructure and the rationales behind 
the planned interventions. This is followed by two empirical sections that shed 
light on the concrete use and consequences of this SIB: section 3 explores how 
care interactions and practices in these projects connect with alternative logics 
and conventions, exhibiting both an emotionalized and behaviorist content. 
Section 4 discusses the performative logics of this market device that aim to 
contain these non-economic entanglements and reinscribe economic principles. 
The paper concludes by reflecting on the controversial poverty politics that 
underpin SIBs. 
The empirical material for this study1 is derived from 38 recorded, tran-
scribed, and coded interviews and participant observation field notes (work-
 
1  Interviews were conducted with charity staff (support workers, team leaders, operation 
managers), service recipients, social investors, council representatives of three projects 
funded through Fair Chance Fund SIBs, and one person involved in the Fair Chance design 
team. Fieldwork took place between February 2017 and January 2018. The interviews were 
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shop participation, advisory appointments) conducted during fieldwork in three 
UK charities financed through Fair Chance Fund Social Impact Bonds. The 
projects were operating between 2015 and 2017 and addressed youth home-
lessness and unemployment. Interviews were conducted with service recipients, 
support workers, team managers, and senior charity staff. 
2. SIBs and the Fair Chance Fund 
A Social Impact Bond is the name given to a vaguely defined financing tool for 
third sector organizations that has, since its inception in 2010, appeared in 
many different forms. First introduced by the UK government to fund an anti-
recidivism project in Peterborough (Disley et al. 2011), the initial idea was to 
facilitate access to funding for small, unprofitable organizations that work with 
a particularly complex target group by linking them to financial market actors. 
In doing so, it was argued, social service provision would become more effi-
cient and entrepreneurial (Liebman 2011). In a nutshell, SIBs build on perfor-
mance-based contracts, usually commissioned by a government agency, 
whereby investors provide upfront funding for a social service intervention 
delivered by a service provider, for instance a charity. If the service provider 
achieves agreed-on outcome targets for a specified cohort of service recipients, 
investors are repaid by the government along with performance-based interest 
rates. If the service provider does not hit these targets, investors lose their in-
vestment (Rangan and Chase 2015). While investors are facing a financial risk, 
service providers bear the reputational risks of failing to achieve targets. 
Since their inception, SIBs have been the object of never-ending modifica-
tions and adaptations, putting into question representations of their uniformity 
and consistency. Also, the concept has geographically traveled and evolved, 
resulting in variegated articulations depending on socio-spatial contexts and 
social issues to be addressed (Dear et al. 2016). Therefore, it makes sense to 
speak of a relatively fuzzy market-oriented social policy instrument that has 
proliferated around some genuine principles and become a malleable frame for 
governments to address a wide spectrum of social problems. 
The SIB-financed projects investigated for this study formed part of the Fair 
Chance Fund, an initiative by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) developed as a response to an alleged support gap for 
young homeless people in the United Kingdom. The £15m fund pays the out-
comes of seven identical SIB-financed projects that were awarded to seven 
 
recorded, transcribed, and coded in MAXQDA on the basis of a qualitative content analysis 
approach following Kuckartz (2014). The coding procedure consisted of two iterative coding 
steps, including an inductive initial coding phase and recoding the material with an inte-
grated, adapted code system. 
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English charities after a one-year tendering process. Running between January 
2015 and December 2017, the schemes aimed at bringing cohorts of 18-24 
year-old, unemployed, and homeless individuals into accommodation, em-
ployment, education, and training. Cohort sizes varied across the projects: 
depending on the submitted bid by the charities, numbers ranged from 150 to 
340 individuals (DCLG 2017).  
Advertised as vehicles to spur and test innovative welfare delivery models 
(interventions), SIBs draw on various evaluation techniques to validate the 
efficacy of these. What is less obvious, however, is to what extent technical 
devices, such as performance targets, benchmarks, and other evaluation tech-
niques, actively shape certain intervention styles. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
2.1  SIB Designs: Financial Logics and Rationalities of Governance 
As a social policy instrument that promises to produce economic value and 
measurable social impact, SIBs are designed around a set of rules and calcula-
tive devices that perform the tasks of commensuration, that is, “the transfor-
mation of different qualities into a common metric” (Espeland and Stevens 
1998, 314). In doing so, these so-called valuation devices enable the qualifica-
tion of commodities, create calculative agencies, and facilitate valuation and 
capitalization (Callon and Muniesa 2005; Muniesa et al. 2017).  
The impact investing and SIB landscape is characterized by a large diversity 
of valuation devices (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). Depending on the specific 
case, they comprise a heterogeneous assemblage of calculative tools, experi-
mental methods, outcome metrics, benchmarks, etc. These assemblages meas-
ure the social impact established in the course of a welfare intervention in 
financial terms, indicate the amount of savings for the state and give an idea 
about the overall performance of the respective service provider. To date, in a 
large number of SIBs social impact has been measured on the basis of random-
ized controlled trials by comparing averaged performance differences between 
intervention groups and control groups (Disley et al. 2011). Yet, recent years 
have seen a trend towards valuation designs that equate social impact with the 
achievement of individual performance outcomes by service recipients. In this 
variation, an outcome tracker, i.e., a set of individual outcome targets with 
assigned price tags, functions as a mechanism to manage, organize, and evalu-
ate charity activities. Commissioning government agencies then pay investors 
the corresponding prices for each achieved outcome.  
The Fair Chance SIBs drew on a similar valuation design. The commission-
ing government agency, the DCLG, defined a set of 21 individual outcomes 
along the dimensions of accommodation, training, education, and employment. 
For each outcome the DCLG assigned a price tag that was to be paid to the 
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investors of the SIB2 after presentation of a valid piece of evidence which 
proved its achievement (DCLG 2014). Thus, unlike other SIBs where outcome 
payments were dependent on the averaged performance of an intervention 
group, in this example payments were staged and tied to the performance of 
each individual program participant of the cohort. The following table shows 
the stipulated outcome metrics and price tags as signposted by the DCLG.3 
Table 1:  Outcome Metrics and Corresponding Tariffs for Fair Chance Fund 
Projects 
Initial, Second, and Third assessment £500, £500, £200 
Move into accommodation £500 
Accommodation sustained for 3, 6, 12, 18 months £1,500 each 
Entry into Education or Training £500 
Individuals first Entry level qualification £1,500 
Level 1 Qualification  £2,500 
Entry into Employment £500 
13/26 weeks part-time employment £3,000/£2,000 
13/26 weeks full-time employment £4,500/£3,500 
6, 13 weeks volunteering £500 each 
20, 26 weeks volunteering £250 each 
Source: DCLG 2014. 
 
If, for instance, a young person was successfully housed for three months and 
had been working part-time for 13 weeks, investors could claim a total amount 
of £5,500 from the government department after the service provider had deliv-
ered corresponding evidence material. Additionally, the DCLG determined a 
set of rules and regulations concerning the use of this outcome tracker. This 
included, for instance, a maximum payment of £17,000 per individual. Fur-
thermore, the DCLG specified valid evidence material required to make an 
outcome claim such as a signed letter from a landlord or a copy of a wage slip 
(DCLG 2014). 
Financial logics and de-risking mechanisms played a crucial role in the de-
sign processes. Decisions on what types of outcomes should be deployed were 
guided by practical questions regarding measurability and whether financial 
accounting techniques could be used. A DCLG report holds, for instance, that 
sustaining accommodation, employment, and education outcomes represent 
“effective proxies for other important, but more difficult to measure outcomes, 
 
2  In six out of seven projects, outcome payments to investors were channeled through a 
special purpose vehicle in order to mitigate against financial risks for charities.  
3  It is important to note that these prices reflect the maximum tariffs the DCLG was willing to 
pay. The DCLG recommended charities bidding for a SIB to offer discounts on these tariffs 
to increase their chances to win the bid (DCLG 2014, 20).  
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including reduced offending, improvements in mental health, confidence, en-
gagement or substance abuse issues” (DCLG 2014 appendix). Also, the maxi-
mum tariffs for each of these outcomes were defined on the basis of the Greater 
London Assembly Rough Sleeping SIB where similar outcomes existed, main-
taining that “accommodation and education, employment and training out-
comes can be effectively priced and are practical to measure” (ibid.). Cooper et 
al. have shown for the London SIB that accounting technologies such as aver-
age net present value calculations were used to gauge the “cost of short-term 
interventions, such as temporary accommodation, reconviction costs, and un-
planned hospital use” (Cooper et al. 2016, 72).  
Moreover, the valuation infrastructure that enabled measurement and valua-
tion of social impact and organized outcome payments to investors was a joint 
effort by DCLG bureaucrats and impact investors. According to an interviewee 
involved in the Fair Chance design team, one of the biggest challenges was to 
design it in a way that both incorporated the agenda of the DCLG and consid-
ered financial actors’ requirements regarding risk and return. For this reason, 
the interviewee remarked, outcomes had to be implemented that functioned 
solely as a means to de-risk the scheme, trigger early cash flows and make it 
more appealing for investors: 
We had to […] de-risk it, to allow the money to flow in. […] We had basically 
some early processed payments which primed the program, de-risked it suffi-
ciently for investors and third sector providers. And the assessment and some 
early milestones of sustaining tenancy were there, which evidence-wise were 
quite hard to link to an end outcome. So arguably, in a pure SIB theory way, 
were no payments linked to an outcome, but they were necessary to make the 
program attractive enough. (interviewee design team) 
Hence, some of the outcomes were not linked to any considerations regarding 
social impact and only served investor interests. Also, outcome metrics were 
deployed according to the intervention style championed by the DCLG at that 
time, i.e., a support style centering around personalization. For example, staged 
milestone outcomes were set to “force an organisation to stick with the same 
individuals for three years […]” (ibid.). By rolling out milestone targets for 
each individual, the DCLG ensured that service providers tailored their ser-
vices, sustained support over the whole course of the project, and provided 
services to the whole cohort. This last example also gives some indication of 
the extent to which the SIB emerges as a tool to address social problems and 
can be equipped with concrete ideas about how this should be done. This be-
comes even clearer when looking at the intervention suggested in these pro-
jects. 
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2.2  SIBs and the Rise of Behaviorally-Inspired Welfare 
Interventions 
In a close interplay with experimental methods and evaluation techniques, SIB 
interventions are often suffused with behaviorally-inspired logics, reflecting the 
rising importance of behaviorism or soft paternalism in social policymaking in 
both the Global North and South (Berndt 2015). Particularly in the UK, a wide 
range of such initiatives have gained a foothold over the past decade as a result 
of intense governmental efforts (Jones et al. 2011; Jones and Whitehead 2018). 
Put simply, models of behavioral and experimental economics understand 
social problems such as poverty, recidivism, homelessness, etc. as resulting 
from behavioral failure, cognitive deficiencies, irrational decision making, or 
even a lack of “character capital” (Gandy et al. 2016). Behavioral economists 
claim that our behavior “is guided not by the perfect logic of a super-computer 
that can analyse the cost-benefits of every action. Instead, it is led by our very 
human, sociable, emotional and sometimes fallible brain” (Dolan et al. 2010, 
13). In short, by bringing to question the role of emotions, behavioral economic 
and economic psychology appears to be a challenge to the rational economic 
agent (Pixley 2012). This is a perspective that (seemingly) departs from idealis-
tic conceptualizations of human beings as fully rational, means-to-ends orient-
ed, utility maximizing. Instead, it points to cognitive insufficiencies and irra-
tionalities that need to be pulled in line and characters that need to be restored. 
To this end, behavioral economics mobilizes two seemingly diverging logics: 
there are, on the one hand, concepts that instigate self-management and trigger 
greater personal responsibility (Dolan et al. 2010; Burd and Hallsworth 2016). 
On the other hand, it draws on more or less subtle disciplining strategies (such 
as text messages) that aim to nudge allegedly deviant or self-harming behavior 
into the “right” direction (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  
Against this background, it is little wonder that these logics also shaped the 
interventions rolled out in Fair Chance projects. Although no explicit refer-
ences to the behavioral script can be found in official documents, the suggested 
interventions drew on elements widely discussed in policy papers by the UK 
Behavioural Insight Team (BIT), a think tank closely connected to the British 
government. This particularly concerns a strong emphasis on the personaliza-
tion of (public) services, the use of messenger effects (e.g., personalized text 
messages from support workers) and commitment devices which all aim, in one 
way or another, to make service recipients commit better to the service, be 
more responsive, or to incite them to take more self-responsibility (Dolan et al. 
2010). For instance, building on experiences from the London Homelessness 
SIB, the “navigator” model was expanded and tested in Fair Chance. Rather 
than only pursing a “housing first” strategy, this intervention emphasized the 
idea that intense personalized interventions and sustained support provided by a 
“navigator” should be given priority (DCLG 2017; see also Cooper et al. 2016, 
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70). For this purpose, personal support workers, sometimes referred to as “life 
coaches,” were assigned to service recipients “to offer a single point of contact 
to guide the participant through the project and provide intensive support, on a 
flexible basis” (DCLG 2017, 18). Therefore, interventions were specifically 
tailored to individual needs and based on a relationship with a support worker 
who was not only responsible for administering the “hard” outcomes but also 
dealt with personal issues of recipients in daily life. Furthermore, in all seven 
projects, charities were working with the “personalisation” or “maintenance” 
fund (DCLG 2017, 22). This was a fixed budget allocated to each program 
participant, allowing support workers to pay individually for personal expenses 
or incentives.  
In sum, this makes for a social policy instrument with a dual nature. One the 
one hand, it is a perfect showcase of financial marketization, that is, a market-
ization serving to capitalize social problems. On the other hand, however, SIBs 
also come with a host of assumptions about the causes of poverty and include 
ideas and strategies to enroll users and implementers in ways that match the 
political and financial objectives of the commissioning government agencies. 
Considering this, the remainder of this paper unpacks the ways the projects 
unfolded and highlights some of the consequences for support workers and 
service recipients at the level of everyday practices and interactions. 
3.  Diverse Articulations: Compassion, Behaviorism, and 
Market Rationality 
Marketization scholars maintain that marketization cannot be understood as a 
story whereby market logics translate downwards and unfold on the ground in 
unambiguous ways. Instead, marketization should be approached as a process 
which is always-in-the-making and crucially includes moments where the 
market/nonmarket divide is blurred. Concrete market arrangements, in turn, are 
described as diverse and proliferative of forms, that is, entities where diverse 
logics – economic and non-economic – entangle and combine (Berndt and 
Boeckler 2011). Similar dynamics can be observed when looking at the effects 
of this SIB on the level of practices, interactions, and relationships. In the SIB 
context practices and relationships are not simply formatted according to a 
neoclassical market script. Ironically, or counter-intuitively, marketization 
proliferates and builds on emotional work, but is at the same time also disrupt-
ed by the emotional register. Three interconnected aspects will be discussed in 
this section. 
First, performance targets changed the way the charity operated, and one of 
the unintended consequences was that it also transformed the relationships 
between charities and service recipients from rather routinized into more flexi-
ble and informal ones. This is reflected by a shift away from a punitive logic 
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common in welfare-to-work schemes and a drive towards an open-door policy 
by rendering participation completely voluntary: rather than being signed off or 
rejected, program participants could “dip in and out of the program when 
they’re ready,” a support worker explained, “rather than me saying, ‘no, you’re 
gonna be doing this, this and this’. They can literally turn around and tell me to 
go away, not seeing me for a couple of weeks but knowing that when they’re 
ready, they can come back straightaway” (support worker 11). In other words, 
participants were welcomed even after long periods of disengagement or disap-
pearance, did not have to run through the referral process again, and could 
resume working with their support worker. In addition to this, neither benefit 
payments were affected nor sanctions were imposed for missed appointments, 
disengagement, or anti-social behavior: “They can come here and swear and 
shout […], throw a chair. You know, we don’t throw them out and say you can 
never come back” (support worker 8). 
The reason for this was twofold. First, as decreed by the DCLG, service re-
cipients could not be signed off and replaced by other eligible individuals, 
arguably preventing charities from only working with “less complex” individu-
als while side-lining problematic cases, that is, problematic from an outcomes 
point of view. Second, charities were forced to keep engagement rates with the 
service as high as possible in order to achieve the projected outcome targets 
and keep the program financially afloat. Normally, an interviewee stated, “if 
these outcomes weren’t there, the file would be closed and that would be it” 
(support worker 25). Not surprisingly, for many support workers a punitive 
approach was therefore considered as counterproductive, leading to disen-
gagement, refusal, and resistance and jeopardizing the success of the project. In 
turn, these informal, voluntary ways of interacting laid the groundwork for 
more trusting and stable relations with the service provider, which were repre-
sented as one of the key reasons why outcome targets were achieved. A support 
worker stated that once recipients understood this voluntary and non-punitive 
mentality, this would facilitate relationship-building, allowing “the mentor […] 
to sort of make their head way in to them and [achieve] more of a buy-in. So, I 
think that has helped with the targets and the outcomes” (support worker 8). It 
therefore dawned on the charity staff early that in order to keep people en-
gaged, other strategies needed to be applied. They agreed that a strict focus on 
“hard outcomes” was not tolerated by service recipients and lead to disen-
gagement. Instead, rather counter-intuitively, a focus on interpersonal relations, 
trust, and soft outcomes, i.e., non-remunerative improvements or achievements, 
became more important. 
A second aspect, resulting from this informal, open nature of the service, 
concerns the way in which strategies of emotionalization and narratives of 
compassion and reciprocity were increasingly mobilized – yet rarely without 
referring to the economic logics of the scheme. In order to achieve outcomes, 
support workers had to engage in an ambivalent boundary play between profes-
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sionality and friendship, between being directive and compassionate, and be-
tween controlling and helpful. An interviewee remarked, for example, that she 
would keep relationships with recipients “completely professional. […] But I 
think you’ve got to sometimes let your guard down that little bit to build a 
relationship with them, because if you don’t have a relationship, they’re not 
gonna tell you anything” (support worker 23). Thus, shifting relations to a 
temporary friend zone was deemed beneficial to figuring out further pathways 
and building up “relationships that allows to support clients effectively and to 
get the end outcome” (support worker 22). In this context, emotional compe-
tencies, empathetic dialogues, and patient listening became important factors, 
allowing support workers to gain access to the personal, intimate worlds of the 
recipients. As one support worker put it, “they want to come and tell you 
they’re pregnant or […] the sexual abuse in the family home or domestic vio-
lence, whatever. We need them to be able to tell us because if they’re not, then 
we’ve lost them” (support worker 1). The importance of being listened to and 
not judged was also expressed by one young woman who emphasized that “it’s 
just so nice having someone else that I can talk to other than my family, about 
stuff” and not feeling “like they’re judging me” (young person 6). In this light, 
charity staff had to assume the roles of pseudo therapists and trusted persons, 
thus replacing the formal and bureaucratic style prevalent in other welfare 
services where “the clients get looked at and assessed but […] don’t get lis-
tened to” (support worker 10). It is not surprising that this personalization 
strategy was ever more successful when it involved two characters that chimed 
together. Hence, team managers sometimes recombined pairs of support work-
ers and recipients in an experimental way in order to find matching characters 
where there was a “buy-in” and no “clash of personality” (support worker 1).  
Consequently, this compassionate style did not only ensure ongoing en-
gagement but also spurred a sense of reciprocity and mutuality which could be 
instrumentalized to achieve outcome targets. A staff member, for instance, 
speculated that they achieved most of the outcome targets “not because that 
we’re like, ‘we need to get this outcome.’ I think it’s because we engage so 
well with the clients and offer that much support […] that the clients are will-
ing to do things back to help” (support worker 23). This was also expressed by 
an interviewed young man who remarked that the project revolved a lot around 
reciprocity: “if you make an effort, they will give something back” (young 
person 5). Having a reciprocal relationship particularly facilitated the strenuous 
work of collecting evidence material, or “chasing the evidence,” as this could 
often be done by the recipients. Hence, in a setting were everything was even-
tually geared towards achieving outcomes and financial performance, compas-
sionate relations ironically appeared to be the only possible entry point to keep 
service recipients engaged.  
However, from a staff point of view, these experimental boundary games 
could also be risky. While the double play of emotionalization and profession-
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alization helped stabilize relations and conjured up a reciprocal rapport, it was 
also a source of friction. An interviewee pointed to these problems, maintaining 
that “it’s a fine balance without being in somebody’s face and getting accused 
of stalking them and pestering them and hunting them down […]. Wherever 
they go, they turn and we are there, you know. There’s a fine balance between 
that and letting somebody know that we’re here if they need us” (support 
worker 22). Indeed, charity staff often found themselves navigating a contested 
zone where compassionate support and controlling/monitoring practices came 
to lay unpleasantly close to each other. Too quickly, it seemed, empathetic 
strategies would turn into monitoring practices, particularly when modern 
communication technology was involved. For instance, social media like Face-
book or WhatsApp were used in one charity as a means to monitor personal 
lives, leisure activities and relationship statuses, providing support workers 
with useful information about whether an outcome target was about to be lost 
or needed to be secured.  
It is not surprising that some staff members problematized this emotionali-
zation of relationships and their instrumentalization for financial ends. For 
instance, an interviewee criticized the precarious nature of these friendships, 
remarking that she would “try to keep it a bit of arm’s length because you’re 
catching a lot of people at the lowest step who maybe don’t have a lot of posi-
tive contacts. And if you then allow them to think you’re a friend, then you’re 
only setting them up to be let down at the end of it” (support worker 24). This 
was not a simple endeavour, however. In a similar vein, the young people 
themselves engaged in this double play, trying to push, transgress and modify 
boundaries, but then, all of a sudden, erecting them again. There were many 
examples where they would list their support workers as emergency contact 
due to a lack of other trusted persons. A support worker thus commented that 
“sometimes they see me more as a friend and I have to reinforce that, you 
know, I am working. Those boundaries are there” (support worker 14). Like-
wise, an interviewee described the relation with her support worker as “more 
sort of friend relationship” (young person 6), while another young man wished 
for the friendship with his support worker to continue after project’s end as 
“he’s more than a social worker, he’s like my brother” (young person 5).  
And in some paradoxical cases, the boundaries were blurred to the extent 
that it was not clear anymore who was the recipient and who the provider of 
help and support. As charities were dependent on evidence material to prove 
outcome achievements, charity staff often had to “chase” or “pin down” reluc-
tant individuals. Sometimes it occurred that they withheld those documents, as 
one interviewee reported: “[T]here’s some that know exactly what the scheme 
is. I have one client […] and he’s worked and he won’t give me any employ-
ment evidence. […] And I’ve tried and tried and tried […] to get it from him 
but he said, ‘No, no! You can’t have it.’ […] I mean, it’s his, it’s his” (support 
worker 25). This paradoxical reversal of care roles also indicates that market-
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based policy interventions such as SIBs sometimes do not only act differently 
to the intended political and economic objectives (Higgins and Larner 2010, 5) 
but can even undermine and jeopardize these goals. 
A third dimension radicalizes these emotionalized conditions and adds a 
psychological nuance to them by drawing on templates from the behavioral 
script presented above. In this respect it is important to point to the role played 
by a therapeutic practice called cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). This is an 
intervention widely used in psychotherapy which has traveled into young peo-
ple’s welfare services and was also used in the New York recidivism SIB. CBT 
is based on the premise that “beliefs, attitudes, and values affect the way people 
think and how they view problems. […] Cognitive behavioural therapy is de-
signed to restructure distorted thinking and perceptions, which in turn changes 
a person’s behaviour for the better” (Rudd et al. 2013, 29). An employability 
coach for one of the services who implemented CBT described it as an ap-
proach that would help the young become more self-responsible, make them 
understand the consequences of their decisions and tease out their aspirations. 
Apparently, the idea was to conjure up ideals of self-responsibilization and 
self-actualization, as became clear in a conversation with a participant: “It’s 
because of Fair Chance that I wanna start my own company. It’s because of 
Fair Chance that they even put that idea in my head. It’s that kind of shaping 
my destiny that Fair Chance has helped doing […]” (young person 4). 
What is more, following the behavioral script introduced above, disciplining 
techniques were mobilized in parallel. This included nudging techniques, that 
is, the construction and management of incentive structures that “significantly 
[alter] the behaviour of Humans” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 9). This took 
concrete form as cell-phone text messages or Facebook messages reminding 
service recipients to do certain things, such as signing and returning important 
documents to the charity regarding housing or employment situations. Another 
young man reported that he got “messages on a daily basis saying, ‘Hi [name], 
you’re alright?’ Just general inquisitive behavior like a friend would do” 
(young person 4). Additionally, charities systematically conducted house visits 
or unannounced “house checks” to check the state of the flat and prevent evic-
tions: “The agreement sometimes is, we have access to the property and will do 
daily house checks, make sure nothing is going on, anything. The buy-in we 
have from that is being absolutely massive. The targets, the targets, the targets” 
(support worker 1). As witnessed during house visits, support workers would 
try and persuade service recipients to attend a particular education course, 
comment on the hygienic situation but also take note of the immediate social 
environment the person was living, i.e., the neighbors, partners or children. 
Hence, interventions did not only address the subject itself but extended to 
proximate social relations. 
In sum, rather than being neutralized by economic principles underlying the 
SIB, emotionalization and affect seemed not only to vividly proliferate but also 
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laid the groundwork for subsequent valuation and capitalization. Following 
Zelizer (2011), this is clear evidence to suggest that mixing intimacy and emo-
tions with economic rationality does not result in inefficiency and failure. In 
contrast, this fusion of market repertoire and emotions appears to be the center-
piece of emotional capitalism, “where emotions have become entities to be 
evaluated, inspected, discussed, bargained, quantified, and commodified” (Il-
louz 2007, 109). Yet, while this emphasis on relationship-building received 
widespread acclaim, it also became clear that they were of temporary and in-
stable nature, caused irritations (e.g., the flipped relations), and raised (ethical) 
question as to what extent overdependence was created. Moreover, by connect-
ing welfare interventions to logics rooted in behavioral economics, narrow 
imaginations about the causes for poverty and controversial approaches to 
resolve social issues were mobilized. 
4.  Reinscribing Economic Logics 
Concrete market arrangements always emerge at the intersection of economic 
and alternative logics, standing in a tense, contested relationship (Berndt and 
Boeckler 2011). Economic reframing processes are always active and, in fact, 
also necessary: only by reinscribing the separation of the market realm and its 
various others, “a constitutive market outside […] populated by nonmarket 
agents that are represented as deviant and in need of help” is created (Berndt 
and Wirth 2018, 15). This section sheds light on the role of valuation devices in 
Fair Chance in the reframing of markets or, in other words, the processes (or 
attempts) of transforming hybrid arrangements into something that comes close 
to the ideal neoclassical market script. Three intertwined aspects are discussed: 
the inscription of calculative agencies, the classificatory work of outcome 
metrics and the stabilizing role of incentive payments.  
First, the valuation infrastructure disposed support workers to rationalize, 
calculate, and take risks. The outcome metrics played an important role in this 
respect. Openly displayed as a large table chart in the offices or circulating as 
spreadsheets during team meetings, they became the central mechanism for 
coordinating and managing interventions. As DeVault (2006) holds, the organ-
izing power and effects of such “texts” within institutions should not be under-
estimated; as “ruling relations,” they help stabilize apparatuses of management 
and control from a distance (see also Billo and Mountz 2016). This effect on 
working practices was exemplified by a support worker who was pointing to 
the salience of monetized outcome targets: 
Before, you got the funding […] and then you did the work, whereas we see 
now the money. [A]s frontline worker you don’t normally see [the money], 
you just get told to do a job and you just do it, don’t you? Whereas with this 
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payment-by-result we know how much stuff is worth. So, we see it, whereas 
before we didn’t see it. (support worker 21) 
Hence, regardless of the diverse personal backgrounds, social work ethics, and 
work experience, the scheme imposed its very own (economic) logic on sup-
port workers, that is, the idea of social progress that can be prized. This is a 
first hint as to what extent financial logics are performatively actualized via 
carefully assembled milestones charts, forcing support workers to adopt new 
perspectives and conceive of service recipients from a human capital point of 
view. This was of course a source of irritations. For many support workers, for 
instance, it was hard to make sense of the fact that in some cases, almost no 
effort was needed to secure an outcome for an individual, whereas other partic-
ipants with “more complex needs” required huge amounts of time and effort 
but would not achieve any of the objectives (support worker 21). It comes as no 
surprise, then, that social work ethics sometimes clashed with the economic 
rationalities that incited support workers to calculate, take risk, seize opportuni-
ties. As one interviewee put it: 
[S]ometimes you might find yourself prioritizing a client you think will get in-
to work so you can get your outcomes more than one that won’t. […] But I try 
not to do that. I try and still check on welfare and things like that. But because 
of the way it’s structured, you’d be more inclined to support a client more that 
you think will get into work as you get your outcomes. (support worker 25) 
Understood from this perspective, support workers themselves needed to be-
come entrepreneurial units or investors, carefully weighing up social work 
ethics and economic necessities, making trade-offs, considering risk-return, 
and, thus, enacting calculative agencies. According to the logic of the scheme, 
this reframing was necessary: it served to delineate economically productive 
practices from those that were not and, in doing so, rendered associated ten-
sions invisible. 
A second aspect points to the long-term, classificatory effects that the use of 
outcome metrics entailed. In the long run, it stratified service recipients accord-
ing to the likeliness of achieving certain outcomes. Facing the end of Fair 
Chance, charity staff had to devise “exit strategies” for those individuals that 
were still struggling to make ends meet. On that occasion, a team leader of one 
of the services spontaneously delineated five classes of “clients” that emerged 
over the three years of the project. A first class included “lead users,” those 
individuals who would go “straight into work, straight into sustaining accom-
modation.” A second, intermediate group comprised individuals that “actually 
can achieve but their aspirations sort of needed to be pulled into line.” Two 
other groups, namely the “concerning” or “chaotic” ones, were described as 
participants that might have aspirations but lack fundamental social skills, 
exhibit mental health issues, and need constant support. A last group, finally, 
was labeled as the “survivors”:  
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They haven’t really achieved a vast amount because they don’t want to. And 
they’re quite happy sat on the welfare system, not doing a lot. […] And no 
matter how many options you put in front of them, it’s not really accepted by 
the peer group or families […]. I think they will always probably be that gen-
eration where they’ll go on to have kids and they also will underachieve. 
(support worker 26)  
Even though this ad-hoc categorization seemed to be an informal heuristic for 
the team leader that helped find solutions for service recipients, the wider so-
cial ramifications should not be overlooked: it reshuffled a heterogeneous set of 
individuals along the economic dimensions suggested by the outcome targets. 
More importantly, this layering of “clients” seemed to be the result of the fram-
ing work performed by the evaluation device, as the team leader continued to 
explain: 
[T]hat’s what payment-by-results does because you can see then the clear gaps 
because you’re observing it in terms of outcomes and who’s achieved what. 
There’s a lot more comparison. Because the referrals were all done within one 
year as well and the project is ending at the same time, it’s fairly clear to kind 
of look at them as one control group and see where the differences lie and see 
which clients have achieved and fallen into kind of what level. (support work-
er 26)  
Following from this, it appears that outcome metrics functioned as a powerful 
classification device that stratified and reshuffled a narrowly defined group of 
young people. In this creative process, new categories are invented which are, 
in turn, defined by their economic value (for investors) or costs (for the state), 
and reflect a yardstick for the ideals of a marketized world, that is, human 
capital, closeness to the labor market, lifelong learning, flexibility, etc. Hence, 
if SIBs are conceptualized as valuation devices that engage in commensuration 
processes, that is, bridging value dissonances and aligning social impact with 
an economic value, we need to acknowledge that new boundaries are created. 
Or as Espeland (2002) puts it, “commensuration […] transgresses the bounda-
ries we erect to contain sameness. But in this process, new forms of sameness 
and difference are invented […].” The example above also shows how stereo-
types about families with a supposed tradition of welfare dependency or wel-
fare as lifestyle choice (see Slater 2012) are reinforced by this “layering” work. 
Therefore, the question remains whether such a classification reproduces 
longstanding preconceptions and pathologizations of a supposed “underclass” 
and is conducive to its capitalization (Kish and Leroy 2015).  
Third, alongside these stratifying and ordering effects of the outcome table 
charts, monetary incentivization represented another crucial tool to stabilize the 
struggles over the boundaries between different economic and non-economic 
logics. Considering the fragile attachments and porous boundaries between 
support workers and service recipients, incentive payments sought to bring care 
relations back in line with economic thinking. In Fair Chance, charities allocat-
ed a personalization budget to each individual participant. This could be uti-
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lized by support workers to pay for personal expenses, i.e., furniture, bus fares, 
working gear, rent arrears, etc. These micro-payments proved to be very bene-
ficial for young people being in transition phases into a new job or a new 
apartment; periods often characterized by high levels of precarity, insecurity, 
and lack of finances. Yet, the personalization budget was also used for pay-
ments to incentivize individuals to participate in workshops, trainings, and 
other activities that were related to an outcome target. Also, some support 
workers sometimes traded gift cards in return for evidence material in order to 
make an outcome claim from the DCLG. In doing so, the reciprocal relation-
ships outlined above rather resembled monetized partnerships between “cli-
ents” and the charity, as a support worker put it (support worker 22). Hence, 
framing relations as “partnerships” and recipients as “clients” is indicative for 
the economizing effects enacted by incentivization techniques. 
From a service recipient perspective, incentives were considered as an op-
portunity to “make a quick buck.” It was no secret, for instance, that these 
strategies were successful in securing the unpopular education outcomes. A 
former participant illustrated the effects of incentivization: 
[W]e obviously have a hundred pound incentives in terms of supervised spent 
or gift card for the clients completing the work books. So, if they do the level-
1 [education outcome], there’s a £100 gift card. “Go get yourself something 
nice”. That's why a lot of the outcomes have come for level-1 really. You start 
throwing money in their face and they’re like: “Oh, yeah, 100 quid.” (young 
person 3) 
While these two quotes are a showcase for the economic twist enacted by in-
centivization, they also show, however, how porous or illusive this imagined, 
reinstated boundary between rational and irrational behavior is. Incentivization 
actively plays on the desires of individuals for leisurely consumption, enjoy-
ment, and self-actualization to more or less subtly entice “clients” to participate 
in corrective programs such as budgeting workshops, employability programs 
or wellbeing classes. Their apparently irrational behavior, normally situated as 
being outside the market frame, then becomes an instrumental and constitutive 
part within.  
However, these practices did not stop at capitalizing on seemingly irrational 
behavior, desires, or aspirations, but advanced further into psychological 
realms. Incentivization techniques were used to act on the participants’ fears, 
low self-esteem, and mental health issues. An interviewee gave the example of 
a young woman who, being self-conscious over her acne, was promised a skin 
treatment as a reward if she participated at a workshop (support worker 16). 
Thus, while the payment-by-results logic has traveled all the way down to the 
ground to economize not only charity practices but also “client”-support work-
er interactions, it seems that “irrational” behavior, desires, compassion, and 
fears appear as constituent factors of the inside of market arrangements (Mitch-
ell 2007). 
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5.  Conclusion 
This paper has explored the ambivalent and contested processes underpinning 
these SIB case studies, maintaining that two diverging effects can be observed. 
First, while interactions and relations between charity staff and social service 
recipients exhibited a strong emotionalized content that was often received 
positively by all actors, concrete welfare interventions tended to shift their 
focus and increasingly addressed the minds of people, aimed at their behavior 
and even extended to their immediate social environment. Second, as a result of 
the performative logic of marketization processes, strong impulses could be 
observed to contain or control these ambivalent entanglements and reinscribe 
economic logics. The performative effects of valuation devices accentuated 
calculative agencies that forced support workers to calculate risk and returns, 
make tradeoffs, and skillfully navigate the conflicted boundary zone of social 
work values and economic reasoning. The heterogeneous group of recipients, 
in turn, tends to be reshuffled and classified into what could be defined as risk 
classes along the dimensions of the stipulated outcome metrics.  
It makes sense to conceive of these two processes not as mutually exclusive 
but as concomitant, yet conflictive forces that shape the marketization process 
of SIBs. Put in the words of McFall et al. (2017, 11), SIBs elicit a multitude of 
sometimes emotional, social attachments and in doing so produce “forms 
where the dividing line between society and economy is wholly unclear.” 
Moreover, it is also important to note that these intertwined effects, at the end 
of the day, lay the groundwork for a successful capitalization of social prob-
lems and the commodification of care relations. This reminds us again of the 
moral fundaments of markets (Fourcade and Healy 2007), the groundlessness 
of conceiving of economic values and social values as “hostile worlds” (Zelizer 
2011), and the crucial role that emotions, sentiments, and psychological tech-
niques play(ed) in the making of capitalism (Illouz 2007).  
Even though the (temporary) emergence of such compassionate and affec-
tive attachments might have empowering and pleasant effects for those subject 
to such interventions, the paper has unveiled their precarious and fragile nature. 
Also, they need to be problematized against the backdrop of a controversial 
politics of poverty alleviation underpinning social finance. This is a logic of 
poverty regulation “based on poor people engaging in self-help and individual 
behavior change – rather than redistribution of resources – [that] is securitized 
through the architecture of finance” (Rosenman 2019, 143). In that sense, this 
article charted the rise of a behaviorally-inspired welfare intervention where 
people’s personalities, behaviors, and minds became the center of attention. By 
breaking non-rational habits, nudging them to certain behavior, and instilling in 
them ideals of self-help and self-responsibilization, a technocratic and anti-
political approach to poverty is mobilized that chimed with the financial re-
quirements of the funding mechanism. 
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What remains unclear, however, is to what extent these heterogeneous artic-
ulations represent unintended side effects/overflows, at times advantageous, at 
times disruptive, or intended/built-in spillovers that served the financial and 
political objectives for which the SIBs were deployed. Against this back-
ground, it is interesting to see the parallels between the affective governance in 
SIBs and the rise of what Jupp et al. (2017) call “emotionalised states” or 
“emotional governance,” that is, “a new enthusiasm for an emotionally attuned 
approach to government which sees emotions as constitutive of the very work-
ings of government and policy” (Pykett et al. 2017, 1). And, given the emer-
gence of behaviorist microinterventions, this also connects to speculations 
about an additional neoliberal moment of “rolling-in”: a form of neoliberal 
governance that is characterized by a psychological approach to poverty and 
governmental interventions that address and shape the minds of individual 
people (Berndt and Boeckler 2017, see also Jones et al. 2013). 
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